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Using transaction cost theory and the theory of multinational
enterprise, this study examines the extent of the degree to which
management of multinational companies can control over its sub-
sidiaries’ configuration and coordination abilities. Empirical
results showed that the subsidiaries enjoyed a significant freedom
when decentralized standards were used in operational and the
production activities. In the long-run, however, the centralized
standards worked better—thegreater the coordination activities
between the multinational companies and their subsidiaries the
lesser the control needed. 
Introduction
This paper presents some empirical findings of an exploratory study into
the governance relationships between multinationals and their Polish sub-
sidiaries. The emerging markets of Central Asia and Eastern Europe (CEE)
have become very attractive for setting up a subsidiary. Many multinational
companies have established operations in new locations, or have expanded
existing operations. New key strategy drivers such as first-mover advantage,
scale economies, and serving local markets through the local companies are
supplementing traditional investment incentives such as cheap labour and raw
materials. These new factors  have contributed a significant change in the glob-
al positioning of multinational corporations. As a result, the Eastern European
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and Central Asian countries accounted for more than 60% of “First-time”
investments in 2002. 
In order to compete and be successful in foreign markets, one needs to
pay special attention to organisational structure and the corporate governance
issues. Recently, a number of real life cases have provided some insights such
that too much freedom provided by headquarters can have disastrous conse-
quences on all parts of a multinational. For example, the Dutch retailers’
(Ahold) insufficient supervision over its subsidiaries in the United States led to
a serious financial and management crisis in 2003 (Smit 2004). Consequently,
the management of the multinational company recognizes the need to change
the governance structure to accommodate a wider dispersion of activities and
the need to coordinate these activities. 
Against this backdrop and building on existing studies on management
control and coordination between headquarters and subsidiaries (Chow, Kato,
et al. 1994; Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Harzing,
Sorge et al., 2001; Chenhall, 2003), this study explores an intriguing research
domain at the subsidiary level in one of the emerging economies of Central
Eastern Europe, namely Poland. More concretely, we attempt to answer three
general research questions:
1. What is the configuration of the management control system (MCS)
in the subsidiaries in Poland? 
2. Does the subsidiary’s role influence the intensity and design of MCS?
3. Does the configuration and intensity of the MCS contrast between
best and the average performing subsidiaries? If so, how?
Using transaction costs theory and the theory of multinational enterprise,
this study explores the degree and configuration of control and coordination
activities embraced by management control systems used by international
headquarters on their Polish subsidiaries. 
Theoretical Framework
Transaction cost economics (TCE) originates from microeconomics
(Hennart 1993; Hart 1995; Williamson 1998).  It has been used to explain the
trade-off between generic modes of governance. Transaction costs economics
(TCE) literature makes a distinction between methods of organising these trans-
actions (hierarchy and price system) and institutions (firms and markets)
(Hennart 1993). These transactions delegate to a central party the right to con-
strain their behaviour. The full delegation organisation-mode is called hierar-
chical. Under hierarchy, one party has a right to make all decisions concerning
allocation of the resources of other party (e.g. employee); the evaluation system
here is based on the obedience to the supervisors’ directives. Markets (in the
absence of transaction costs) rely on prices to convey information necessary to
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reach optimal joint decision (Meyer 1998; Williamson 1999). Although its
application has been confined to issues at the level of generic forms, the TCE
explanatory structure is highly micro-analytical in its orientation with the (indi-
vidual) transaction as a unit of analysis. 
TCE suggests that management control structures can usefully be
analysed as (implicit or explicit, formal or informal) contracts between the
organisation and its members that serve to govern these contributions (Spekle
2001). Covaleski et al. (2003) completed the Spekle’s efficiency-seeking
approach with legitimacy seeking facets for management control and described
the influence of societal and regulatory environment. Network approach pre-
sented by Powell (1990) added that some forms of economic exchange are
embedded in a particular social context and that some relationships are more
dependent on social contacts, mutual interests and are less guided by the formal
structure of authority.. He described a third mode of exchange that cannot be
placed on the market hierarchy continuum. It is characterised by high interde-
pendencies among parties - a network of companies. A similar approach has
been developed for international management by Bartlett and Goshal (1998).
They observed that companies with governance structures tailored for compet-
ing whether on local (decentralised governance) or global (centralised) markets
do not succeed in sourcing from the opportunities of current economic devel-
opments. Companies focusing on local markets, and therefore decentralising
their governance could not acquire sufficient information about their foreign
operations and hence lost control. This narrow focus would impede the devel-
opment of the whole company or even would threat their profits. On the other
hand, global centralisation restrains from incorporating ideas and signals from
the subsidiaries, which makes the governance too rigid and can result in con-
flicts. In this research we attempt to integrate both the transactional and rela-
tional (societal) issues and develop a model for management control.
Conceptualisation of Management Control Systems
Table 1 presents a general overview of the Management Control System vari-
ables used in the study.
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Construct: COORDINATION Construct: CONTROL
1. Formality of contacts and local management 1. Standardization 
2. Frequency of network meetings 2. Use of formal procedures
3. Personal contacts between departments 3. Frequency of written reports 
4. Attuning of functional issues 4. Headquarters’ inquiries on reports
5. Level of ICT integration 
6. Intensity of contacts on R&D
Table 1.  Overview of the constructs and variables used in the study.
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The broad definition of control described by Omta (1995) and De Leeuw
(1994) has embraced that any activities that aim at goal directed influence, both
those facilitating centralisation and decentralisation, is control.  Anthony and
Govindarajan (2001) added word “system” to the management control, for the
activities of the management control are prescribed and have a repetitive char-
acter. 
Control can include devices to influence interpersonal behaviour, limit-
ing opportunism and creating transaction costs. On the other hand, not all coor-
dination is control, since not all co-ordinated activities limit behavioural alter-
natives. Otherwise stated, the power element in co-ordination is more ‘implic-
it’ sometimes. According to Anthony and Govindarajan (2001), co-ordination
establishes concerted actions among functional activities or organisational units
with the aim of internalisation of norms and beliefs by employees. Planning as
an element of coordination attempts to reduce uncertainty (Hofstede 1980).
Coordination in this research includes setting standards, specifying activities
and the application of liaison devices. In our view, co-ordination and control
mechanisms are complementary and are parts of the management control sys-
tems. The relationship between the two concepts is visualised in Figure 1.
Figure 1.  Management Control Systems
(1) Co-ordination, no control: persuasion, copying behaviour, planning,
etc.
(2) Co-ordination and control: hierarchy, formalisation, flexibility, etc. 
(3) Control, no co-ordination: prisoner’s situation.
Management control system consists of mechanism, which has primary
an internal focus as opposed to strategic control, which emphasizes how to
compete in the market. Similarly to Mintzberg’s (1983) approach, in the pres-
ent study managerial control primarily stresses the power element in the rela-
tionship between headquarters and subsidiary, and concentrates on standards
and plans’ assessment. A “control”-relationship means a formal, hierarchical
unbalanced relationship between headquarters and subsidiary, regulating activ-
ities according to the expectations of the headquarters. Such a relationship has
mostly an impersonal character: a subsidiary is supposed to refer to a document
Co-ordination (1)
Control (3)
(2)
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or a rule instead of looking for personal contact with the headquarter personnel
(Harzing 1999). If these documents or rules are in a written form and/or bear
official character (include stamps, signatures etc.), then we talk about the for-
malization aspect of control (Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998). Some companies
apply unified forms of reports throughout the whole multinational (including
all the subsidiaries). In that case these reports are standardised. The frequency
and variety of reports are used to measure the realised output (Cray 1984). The
submission of these reports is usually imposed by external stakeholders (e.g.
tax authorities). Consequently, often a subsidiary provides headquarters with a
copy of the same report. This makes it difficult to assign whether the informa-
tion included in the report is being read or processed. Adding to the existing
theory on the management control, this study includes the frequency of
inquiries from the headquarters on the submitted reports.
The power element in coordination seems to be more ‘implicit’ and aims
at establishing concerted actions among functional activities and the internali-
sation of norms and beliefs between organisation members. Coordination activ-
ities have mostly personal character and embrace personal contacts, personal
supervision, joint actions and application of liaison devices1. We classified the
coordination activities across the structural and functional lines in the organi-
sation. On the structural level, a measure for personal contacts between the dif-
ferent departments was used by Bremmers et. al (2003) and included the fre-
quency of contacts between the heads of several departments in company. Next
to exploring the contacts between departments, we adjusted Cray’s (1984)
measures for the functional attuning between headquarters and subsidiaries. He
used the functional attuning in the research on the integration of French and
British subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals. 
According to Martinez and Jarillo (1989), in increased international com-
petition pure structural and formal mechanisms fail to respond to diverse strate-
gic requirements of global strategy and local (national) responsiveness. To cope
with complex environmental conditions a need for increased flexibility in the
management of multinational operations arises. Therefore existing structural
and formal managerial devices are extended with new cross-departmental,
informal and other subtle mechanisms. To give an example: micro structural
arrangements (liaison devices or lateral relations) cross the formal lines of the
macro structure —teams, task forces, committees, individual integrators and
integrative departments, informal communication channels, informal relations
among the managers without the distinction between HQ-managers and sub-
sidiary managers (Martinez and Jarillo 1989). In the present study, these coor-
dination mechanisms were adapted from Nobel and Birkinshaw’s (1998)
socialisation and networks and included the frequency of joint (with headquar-
ters and other subsidiaries) participation in committees and project groups,
information exchange between companies and business meetings with other
subsidiaries. 
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Subsidiary role and the Management Control System
The second research question concerns the subsidiary’s role in influenc-
ing the management control systems. Multinational companies (MNC) deal dif-
ferently with different subsidiaries and such dealings are not symmetrical
(Goshal and Nohria 1989). Control issues in MNC’s should not only consider
the design of various control systems for subsidiaries top-down control, but
also pay attention to the control exercised by powerful subsidiaries bottom-up
or laterally. This question relates to the importance of distinguishing various
subsidiary roles and the effect these roles may have on the level and the type of
control exercised. The recent emergence of the multi-centre - or transnational -
firms stimulates transfers not only from headquarters to subsidiaries but also
the opposite way as well as among subsidiaries (Martinez and Jarillo 1991).
Transnational companies combine global efficiency (e.g. making use of scale
economies) with local responsiveness (adjusting products and process to local
markets). It is only possible if the headquarters are able to collect information
and knowledge from local markets and utilize it in global arena. This cannot
take place without a change in the role of a subsidiary.
A subsidiary’s role varies according to the level of strategic integration of
the operations across countries (Doz and Prahalad 1984). Strategic integration
stems from economic, technological and competitive conditions of the firm’s
activities, while national responsiveness is required by the diversity in market
conditions, social environment and political systems. The existence of the
needs for both responsiveness and integration raises difficult issues for interna-
tional management. With this in mind, subsidiaries can be divided into three
groups: 
- receptive subsidiaries - which are pipelines of the headquarters’ oper-
ations, usually perform only a small part of the activities, e.g. only
sales function,
- autonomous subsidiaries — which is highly responsive to the local
needs, and usually perform many activities independent of the head-
quarters 
- active subsidiaries — play an important role in the headquarters’ net-
work, perform many activities including R&D.
Martinez and Jarillo (1991) divided the subsidiary roles according to their
level of integration with the headquarters and extent of local responsiveness.
A firm configures its international strategy around the activities of a
value-added chain (Kogut 1984). The concept of value chain was developed by
Porter (1986) and consists of primary and supporting activities. Primary activ-
ities concern directly the production process and include: inbound logistics,
operations, outbound logistics and marketing and sales. Support activities
embrace the non-material activities in the company, such as general adminis-
tration (infrastructure), human resource management, research, technology and
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systems development and procurement. In the present study, the scope of the
value chain reflects the locus of the decision making on primary and support-
ing functions performed within the subsidiary’s boundaries: strategic planning,
setting performance standards and research and development, manufacturing,
and marketing and sales. 
As Figure 2 shows, a broader value chain scope implies that the sub-
sidiary has a specific role and is likely more self-contained with respect to var-
ious functional resources and thereby experiences a lower resource dependence
vis-à-vis the rest of the MNC network (Bartlett and Goshal 1987). Subsidiary
roles determine the level and the portfolio of control mechanisms (Harzing p.
294 (1999).
In the receptive subsidiary, the headquarters will make a greater use of
formal control mechanisms (explicit) and that an active subsidiary will take
part in networks and develop multilateral relationships (heavier use of informal
and implicit co-ordination mechanisms). The autonomous subsidiaries require
a lot of freedom from headquarters to be able to recognise and respond to the
needs of the local market. Previous studies confirm that in this case the control
Figure 2.  Strategies of individual subsidiaries with illustration of value
chain activities. Adapted from (Martinez and Jarillo 1991)
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should not be extensive so as not to hamper the development of the subsidiary.
Therefore:
H1 Subsidiaries that perform an autonomous role will be subject to lower level
of overall management coordination than receptive and active subsidiaries.
Martinez and Jarillo’s study (1991) shows that receptive subsidiaries are
strongly controlled. Such subsidiaries are considered as an extension of the
headquarters and are fully dependent on it, strategically as well as operational-
ly. In this case a greater extent of formal control as well as intensive use of
coordinating mechanisms (planning, formal meetings) can be expected.  
H2 Receptive subsidiaries will experience a larger extent of control than active
and autonomous subsidiaries.
The latest phenomenon described in international organisation theory is
the development of a new group of subsidiaries that are able to influence their
headquarters (Martinez and Jarillo 1991; Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995;
Harzing 1999). The international organisation changes in the direction of a hor-
izontal structure, where the position of subsidiaries evolves from auxiliary to
strategically significant one. In this new situation, subsidiaries (not exclusively
headquarters as it used to be) develop and sustain extensive contacts and com-
munication with headquarters and other subsidiaries. The development should
also be noticeable in the portfolio of control and coordination mechanisms.
Therefore:
H3 Active subsidiaries will experience a higher level of co-ordination than the
two other groups.
This research will focus on the development of the typology of coordina-
tion mechanisms applied by headquarters to its subsidiaries through tests of the
hypotheses proposed above.
Management Control System (MCS) and Performance
The third research question tries to explain the relationship between the
configuration and the intensity of MCS and the subsidiary performance.
Multinational companies (MNCs) have generally diverse objectives when
expanding into emerging markets (Geringer 1989). The concept of measuring
performance in the international management is a frequently discussed and
debated issue (Dess and Robinson 1984; Chakravarthy 1986; Luo and Peng
1999; Epstein and Roy 2001). The accounting perspective claims that the head-
quarters increase the intensity of the MCS after the performance has worsened
in order to adjust for deviations from planned strategy and operations (Drury
2000; Anthony and Govindarajan 2001). On the other hand, an intensified MCS
assures achieving planned goals and objectives (Egelhoff 1988; Harzing 1999).
These two streams in the scientific research make the explanation of the rela-
tionship between management control systems (MCS) and performance
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extremely difficult. Additionally, the data for measuring success of the influ-
ence of MCS on the performance has still to be provided (Epstein and Manzoni
2002). The latest trends, including integrated measures (e.g. Kaplan &Norton
Balanced Scorecard), suggest for evaluating various management controls.
However, the integrated measures make comparisons between companies diffi-
cult2 (Epstein and Manzoni 2002). 
Definitely, the research of Chandler and Hanks (1993) offers an advan-
tage in the use of the performance measures. It suggests that the use of subjec-
tive measures of firm performance (relative to competitors) are particularly
useful in studying emerging businesses, and that these measures correlate with
the objective measures with a high degree of reliability. Such measures were
successfully applied by Luo and Peng (1999), who measured performance with
managers’ perceptions on four factors concerning the competitive position of a
company  and managers’ satisfaction about the company operations. 
Being aware of the difficulty in gathering and comparing financial data,
we included the long-and short-term perceptions on performance satisfaction
and then compared the groups with higher and lower performance clusters and
their MCS configurations.
Data Collection
In 2004, we collected seventy-four extended surveys from the Chief
Executive Officers of international manufacturing subsidiaries in Poland to
explore the control relationship between headquarters and their subsidiaries. In
some cases, the survey was filled out by other employees of the organisation
and then consulted for an approval with the director. The items included in the
survey were measured on the 7-point Likert scale with anchors strongly dis-
agree to strongly agree, or by recurrence in time varying from daily to less than
once per year in case of the meetings or contacts.
During the research process, an opportunity to engage several headquar-
ters in the data collection appeared. So, finally, their characteristics were
analysed as well. 
Results
Having collected the surveys, the data was first explored for the general
overview. Next, we applied statistical techniques such as correlations; cluster
analysis and group comparisons frequencies to describe the underlying rela-
tionships. According to Hoyle (1999) these techniques are suitable for small
sample size, ordinal data and non-normal distribution of data.  Missing data was
replaced applying EM (Expectation-Maximization) method, which is an itera-
tive two-stage method for incomplete data problems. The EM method has var-
ious applications in social sciences and has been proven to provide better
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results than replacing missing data with a mean value (Little and Rubin 1987).
First we performed factor analysis (Principal Axis Factoring) on multi-
item questions included for measuring two constructs of management control
system: coordination and control. An overview of acquired factor scores and
underlying items is included in the Appendix. The scale measurement reliabil-
ity for the two constructs was tested by calculating Cronbach Alpha’s: for con-
trol a = .76 and for coordination a = .77, both at an acceptable ≥ .7 level (Hair,
Anderson et al. 1998). 
Baseline Description
Despite the fact that in the majority of the cases the CEO was Polish, and
the strategic decision-making was often centralized in the foreign headquarters.
Standardized polices and procedures imposed by the headquarters were posi-
tively correlated with the centralization of the decisions on product distribution
and advertisement. Similarly, the centralized standardization involved a higher
formality in the contacts between the subsidiary and the headquarters depart-
ments. The same imposed standardization also implied a higher frequency of
the subsidiary reports over long-term issues, development of the market share,
education of the personnel and R&D. At the same time, intensified reports
evoked more inquiries and questions on these issues (intensified communica-
tion) from the headquarters.  
On the other hand, in the coordination activities, the frequent attuning of
number of functional activities involved decentralized standardization and less
frequent reporting on production volume and sales turnover. Interestingly, the
intensity of attuning activities was associated with less frequent contacts
between the heads of particular departments. The explanation here could be that
the attuning took place mostly between line-employees instead of the heads of
the departments. Frequent attuning  was also associated with the engagement of
the subsidiaries’ employees in the permanent and/or contemporary project
groups and task teams organized together with the headquarters. It seems that
the more the coordination activities took place, the less the control was needed.
Subsidiary Role 
In general, the results show that subsidiaries enjoyed a significant free-
dom in decision-making concerning the operational and the production issues.
The long-term strategic decisions, such as strategic planning or setting per-
formance standards, were centralised at the headquarters, however, as depicted
in Figure 3.
Following the theoretical design, the roles of subsidiaries were identified,
and cluster analysis was performed on the five items in the question concern-
ing the location of decisions in strategic and operational areas. First, we per-
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formed hierarchical between-groups cluster in order to explore the cases for
possible clusters. Second, we validated the three identified hierarchical clusters
by comparing the results with clusters from non-hierarchical (K-means)
method with pre-specified cluster centres from hierarchical analysis. Both
results showed a high level of  convergence making the clusters stable and valid
(Romesburg 1984). Figure 4 shows the cluster centres for three groups of sub-
sidiaries: active, receptive and autonomous. The higher the value of the cluster
centre the more decentralised the decision-making. Autonomous subsidiaries
decide independently on both strategic as well as operational issues (the outer
pentagram in the Figure 4). Only in decisions concerning strategic planning and
R&D autonomous subsidiaries do not score the maximum value.  
Figure 3.  The location of the decision-making process for the subsidiaries
in Poland, N=74 
Figure 4.  The cluster membership for subsidiaries, N=74
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Receptive subsidiaries present the opposite picture. Except for the manu-
facturing and quality control, all decisions were centralised at headquarters.
This confirms our expectation for receptive subsidiaries to perform only select-
ed operational activities independently of the headquarters. Active subsidiaries
showed mostly joint decision-making with the headquarters (values 3 and 4 in
Figure 4), especially in the strategic issues and setting performance standards.
At the same time, they enjoyed a higher autonomy in the operational decisions
concerning manufacturing and marketing (values 6 in Figure 4).
Subsidiary Role and Management Control System
To compare the intensity of the Management Control Systems (MCS)
across the three clusters of subsidiaries, we applied Kruskal-Wallis rank mean
test. Out of eleven MCS variables compared across the three clusters, five vari-
ables showed significant differences between the clusters (See Table 2). 
Test Statistics (a,b) 3 Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig.
Formal personal contacts on R&D 9.90 2 0.01
Formality of contacts & local management 7.41 2 0.02
Standardisation by headquarters 6.61 2 0.04
Contacts between departments 5.67 2 0.06
Functional attuning 4.72 2 0.09
Table 2.  The significant differences on MCS variables between
three subsidiary roles, N=74 
The formalisation factor and the frequency of personal contacts between
R&D departments of headquarters and subsidiaries showed the strongest con-
trast between three clusters. Autonomous subsidiaries presented the highest
intensity and formalisation in R&D contacts, followed by receptive and active
ones. Active subsidiaries had also a lower (than receptive subsidiaries) level of
formalization of documents in communication with headquarters. Personal
contacts between the CEO and the different department heads together with
attuning of functional activities showed differences at lower level of signifi-
cance—(italics in Table 2) 0.104. Concerning the control construct, only one of
the four variables used showed significant difference between clusters. It
appears that headquarters imposed standardised procedures and policies, espe-
cially in receptive subsidiaries. Conversely, active subsidiaries showed the low-
est mean value for these standardised policies and procedures. Figure 5 pres-
ents the mean ranks for all significant differences between the three clusters of
subsidiaries.
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Figure 5.  Mean ranks for five areas of MCS with significant differences
between subsidiaries.
Next, we took a more in-depth look into the differences between the clus-
ters by applying post hoc analysis (LSD test) for multiple comparisons. This
method allows for identifying differences between the groups. The results of
post hoc analysis showed significant differences in frequency of reporting on
strategic issues between active and receptive subsidiaries. Active subsidiaries
reported less often (than receptive subsidiaries) to the headquarters on strategic
issues like R&D, market share development and education.
Finally we summed up the means for the three clusters for six variables
in the coordination construct and four in control construct to compare the over-
all level of Management Control Systems (MCS). Table 3 shows that active
subsidiaries had the lowest values for the overall intensity of MCS whereas
receptive and autonomous subsidiaries showed much higher scores. Receptive
subsidiary were strongly controlled whereas the others had a higher intensity of
coordinating mechanisms.
Subsidiary
MCS element Active Receptive Autonomous
Control 159 182 190
Coordination 207 225 213
Table 3.  Summed score of coordination and control variables
for three clusters. N=74
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Performance comparison 
The last phase of the analysis dealt with evaluating the performance of
the subsidiary. As mentioned in the theoretical part, there are a number of
impediments in evaluating foreign subsidiary performance. Definitely the most
important one is the availability and willingness of sharing the internal compa-
ny (headquarters-subsidiary) financial data. However, in earlier research proj-
ects, we experienced that including questions on financial indicators can seri-
ously decrease the response rate. Additionally, financial indicators to be used
for comparisons should be corrected for a number of characteristics (e.g. com-
pany size, strategy, multinationality), which makes the research too extensive
and thereby may negatively influence the response rate. To avoid such threats,
this research concentrated on investigating the perceptions of the subsidiary’s
CEOs about their subsidiary’s performance: short term and long term perform-
ance as compared to competitors from the customers’ perspective. The per-
formance concept was measured by six questions on a 7-point Likert scale and
had a reliability score of 0.83  (Cronbach Alpha), indicating a high level of reli-
ability (Cortina 1993).
Generally, the managers were satisfied with their overall performance,
especially in evaluating their short-term performance — 55% of the respon-
dents stated accomplishment of the operational goals last year. When evaluat-
ing a subsidiary’s position compared to its competitors, CEOs choose for a
more moderated position. More than half of the subsidiaries’ representatives
positively evaluated their current position compared to their competitors, but
only 15 % strongly agreed with the statement. 
In the next step of the analysis, we created two clusters of higher and
lower performing subsidiaries based on five questions related to performance.
These groups were then compared for the differences on eleven variables of
Management Control Systems. The level of ICT integration and the frequency
of headquarters inquiries on submitted reports showed significant differences
for two performance groups. The intensity of attuning of functional activities
slightly missed the significance level in Kruskal-Wallis test but was significant
when the median test was applied. Both the intensity of inquiries on submitted
reports on sales turnover, production volume, market share development, R&D
and human resource issues as well as the intensity of attuning with headquar-
ters for these issues were higher in the low-performing group than in the high-
performing subsidiaries. As to ICT integration, companies in the cluster with
better performance were highly integrated with their headquarters. That is to
say, they were able to forward and receive information much faster than  the
low-performance group. Figure 6 presents the higher rank mean values of
inquiries and attuning for low-performing subsidiaries and a higher ICT inte-
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gration of high performing subsidiaries. As we can see in Figure 7, the high per-
forming group appreciate the headquarters interference and succeeded in
accomplishing the headquarters’ strategic goals. For the latter one we also ques-
tioned 16 managers from multinational headquarters based in France. The score
was very similar to the response from the subsidiaries (mean value 5.6).  
Figure 7.  Significant differences between high
and low performing subsidiaries
Figure 6.  Significant differences on MCS
variables between high and low performing
subsidiaries
Discussion and Conclusions
By combining the generic elements of TCE with social context and mutu-
al interest from networks in this research, we showed the importance of a sys-
tems approach to this relationship. The extensive application of coordination
activities in the management of foreign operations, especially concerning oper-
ational issues, confirms the necessity of incorporating coordination variables in
the research on MCS. Control was used less often, at least concerning written
reports. The monthly frequency indicates possible external obligations of the
subsidiary concerning reporting to tax offices and other authorities. 
The research showed some differences in MCS devices between sub-
sidiaries clustered in three groups: active, receptive and autonomous. However
the hypothesis 1 proposing a lower level of an overall management co-ordina-
tion for autonomous subsidiary can be only partially supported because active
subsidiaries showed even lower level of coordination. 
Hypothesis 2 predicting a highest extent of control for receptive sub-
sidiaries again is supported only partially as autonomous subsidiaries received
the highest score for control intensity. This is clearly in contradiction to the pre-
vious results (Cray 1984; Egelhoff 1984; Harzing 1999). The explanation could
be in the environmental factors. Indeed, we found a positive correlation
between environmental uncertainty (legal and political aspects) and number of
personal contacts between the heads of different departments. The intensified
contacts in an uncertain environment aim probably at reducing uncertainty of
managing autonomous operations, particularly relating to a chance for oppor-
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tunistic behaviour of subsidiaries’ employees. It could also indicate that
autonomous subsidiaries such as recognised in so-called Western-Countries do
not exist in emerging economies in their pure form. In other words, the overall
high level of interaction and intensified communication between headquarters
and its polish subsidiaries prevents from somehow uncontrolled developments
in subsidiaries such as those experienced by Dutch Ahold mentioned in the
introduction.
The last hypothesis predicting the highest intensity of MCS for active
subsidiaries must be wholly rejected. The theory suggested that this group of
companies searches for feedback and cooperation from their subsidiaries in
anticipation of changes in the market and customer tastes and to take advantage
of opportunities of the dynamic environment. On the contrary, this group
showed the lowest overall score for the MCS, both coordination and control.
However, we saw that that many decisions are made jointly with the headquar-
ters hence probably intensified coordination and control was not needed
because of this joint decision process. We also controlled for the influence of
external environment for the active subsidiaries  and investigated the relation-
ship between the dynamism of the environment and the coordination variables:
The result showed that attuning of functional activities was positively correlat-
ed with changing customer tastes and intensity of competition (environmental
dynamism). Moreover, the reports on motivation of the personnel, development
of market share and R&D were positively correlated to the environmental
munificence. These two positive correlations are in line with the hypothesis 3.
Two important conclusions could be drawn from the performance analy-
sis. Firstly, the average performing subsidiaries seemed to need more intensi-
fied attuning of functional activities such as sales turnover, production volume,
development of the market share, education and motivation of personnel, and
product and process R&D. For this group of worse performing subsidiaries,
headquarters asked more often questions on the submitted reports. So both con-
trol and coordination were used intensively. This is in line with the general
accounting theory, which uses MCS to correct and adjust behaviour or actions
to the planned track. The high ICT integration found in the well-performing
group stresses the importance of availability and use of up-to-date (often real-
time) information flow for management of foreign operations. It can compen-
sate for the disadvantages of the geographical distance.
To conclude, our research has made two key contributions. First, the
empirical results confirmed the complementary character of the control and
coordination activities in the management of foreign subsidiary. It points out
the practical relevance of the application of the management control systems to
subsidiary management. Secondly, this research has attempted to increase our
understanding of under-researched field of the international management in the
emerging market of Central Eastern Europe. 
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Number of Cases in each Cluster on Subsidiary role
Cluster 1 active 39.000
2 receptive 22.000
3 autonomous 13.000
Valid 74.000
Missing .000
1. Standardization
2. Use of formal procedures
3. Frequency of written reports
4. Headquarters’ inquiries on
reports
Appendix
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Construct: Type
COORDINATION
1. Formality of contacts and
local management
2. Frequency of network
meetings
3. Personal contacts between
departments
4. Attuning of functional
issues 
5. Level of ICT integration 
6. Intensity of contacts on
R&D
Factor score 
Factor score 
Factor score 
Factor score 
Factor Score
Factor Score
Formality of personal contacts between CEOs,
marketing departments, manufacturing depart-
ments and logistics departments and the pres-
ence of local people in the management 
Task and project groups Business meetings 
Frequency of personal contacts 
All attuning activities sales, prod etc.
Formality of personal contacts between logis-
tic. Dep. ICT integration between comp. 
Formality of personal contacts[FORM39CX]
C=R&D
Frequency of personal contacts [CONT38CX]
Variable 
Variable 
Factor  
Factor 
Standardised procedures and policies
We use pre-structured, formal documents in reporting
to the HQ
The first two reporting activities score on factor,
whereas the more long-term issues included in the
report on motivation of the personnel, development
of market share and R&D score all on the second fac-
tor. 
Questions about the content of the submitted reports
on sales turnover, production volume, development
of market share, education and motivation of person-
nel, R&D
Construct: CONTROL Type
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Kruskal Wallis test on two performance clusters
Description Cluster N Mean Rank
HQ inquiries on submitted reports Low Performance 25 42
High  Performance 45 32
Total 70
ICT integration between HQ and subsidiary Low Performance 25 28
High  Performance 45 39
Total 70
Functional attuning Low Performance 25 40
High  Performance 45 33
Total 70
